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Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. U.S., 617 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
On March 30, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that the recurring flooding of a wildlife management area
caused by dam releases did not constitute a taking by dam operators,
reversing a Court of Federal Claims decision awarding the manager of the
wildlife area damages for trees destroyed by the flooding.
The background leading to this case began in 1948, when the
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") completed construction of Clearwater
Dam on the Black River in Southeast Missouri, approximately 115 miles
upstream of the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area
("Management Area") in Northwest Arkansas. Following Clearwater
Dam's completion, the Corps conducted a five-year analysis,
experimenting with various frequencies and durations of water releases
from Clearwater Dam to establish a water control plan. In 1953, the plan
was approved and incorporated as part of the Clearwater Lake Water
Control Manual ("Manual"). Under the Manual's "normal regulation,"
releases were regulated so that the water height at a designated point
between the dam and the Management Area did not exceed ten-and-one-
half feet during the agricultural growing season and eleven-and-one-half
feet during the non-growing season. The Manual allowed for deviations
from the normal regulation releases for several reasons, including planned
deviations requested for agricultural, recreational and other purposes.
Planned deviations were only made for limited periods of time and were
approved by the Corps, which considered flood potential and other effects
of the deviation in making its decision.
Forty years after the adoption of the Manual, the Corps approved a
planned deviation for a three-month period from September 29 to
December 15, 1993, lowering the maximum release level to six feet. That
same year, the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission ("Commission")
objected to deviations from the 1953 plan that would lower the release
rates. Lower maximum release rates meant the water would evacuate
from Clearwater Dam more slowly, causing more consistent downstream
flooding during the tree-growing season in the Management Area, which
the Commission managed. Conversely, higher release rates would result
in short-term waves of flooding that would quickly recede.
ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
The planned deviations continued, and during the period of 1994
through 2000 the Corps periodically approved three different deviation
plans with different release rates. For all but two of the years the
deviation plans were in place, the release rates deviated from the 1953
plan generally from April through November, comprising the entirety of
the tree-growing season during those years. During this entire period,
efforts were made to propose a permanent amendment to the 1953 plan,
but none was ever adopted.
In 2005, the Commission brought suit against the United States in
the Court of Federal Claims, asserting the temporary release rate
deviations caused repeated increased flooding and damaged and destroyed
timber in the Management Area, which constituted a taking of a flowage
easement and entitled the Commission to compensation. The Claims
Court found that while a permanent flowage easement was not taken by
the flooding attributable to the Corps' deviations, a temporary flowage
easement had been taken. The Claims Court concluded that this
temporary activity, combined with the damaged timber, was enough to
constitute a taking of a flowage easement and awarded the Commission
$5,778,757.90 in damages for dead or declining timber and regeneration
costs. The United States appealed, contending that no taking had
occurred, and that if it had, the damages were overstated. The
Commission cross-appealed, contending that the Claims Court should
have awarded additional damages for regeneration.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed the Claims Court decision. The Federal Circuit focused its
review of the case by differentiating between a taking and a tort. The
court held that because the intermittent flooding was temporary in nature,
and was not inevitable to recur, it was therefore an injury and not a taking.
To arrive at this holding, the Federal Circuit looked to the Manual to
determine if the government's flood control policy was permanent or
temporary. Because the deviations were ad hoc, the court determined they
could not inevitably recur, and were only temporary.
Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, in her dissent, explained that
extended and repeated flooding of property does constitute a taking. In
coming to her conclusion, Judge Newman cited numerous cases
supporting the idea that a temporary taking, when combined with
permanent damage like the destruction of timber, requires the court to find
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a taking has occurred. Judge Newman explained that the majority erred in
only asking whether the injurious flooding was eventually ended, and not





Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Service, 640 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
2011)
In Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Service, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the decision of the
United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") to not require a plan of
operations after receiving a Notice of Intent ("NOI") from the New 49'ers
("miners"), did not constitute "agency action" under the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"). More specifically, the court held that the Forest
Service's decision to not require a plan is considered an agency's decision
not to act, therefore affirming summary judgment granted in favor of the
defendants, the miners.
The Klamath River ("River") runs through part of the Californian
land the Karuk Tribe has considered home for many centuries. Gold
deposits are located in the River, as well as the Coho, or silver salmon, for
which the River is a designated critical habitat. Additionally, the River is
a source of cultural and religious significance to the Tribe. To remove the
gold deposits, miners will employ a machine called a suction dredger,
which vacuums a small area of the riverbed and extracts the gold from
other sediments. The Tribe contends that this mining significantly
disturbs surface resources and destroys the aquatic habitat. Particularly,
they allege that this mining activity kills salmonid and other fish eggs,
kills fish food sources and disturbs the fish and their reproductive
activities. However, the miners disagree and assert that there is no
evidence that the mining causes harm to the Coho salmon.
The ESA standard for an "agency action" is whether the activity
"may affect" a listed species, however, neither the district court nor the
Ninth Circuit resolved this issue. The miners, the Forest Service and the
Tribe met to discuss what criteria the Forest Service should enforce in
evaluating whether a plan of operation should be required for the proposed
suction dredger action.
The Organic Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-78, ("Organic
Act") provides that federal forest lands are subject to United States mining
laws. The Organic Act organized a scheme where the Forest Service
could regulate mining activity on federal forest lands, but could not
intervene with or prohibit activities permitted under the federal mining
laws. Pursuant to the Organic Act, the Forest Service promulgated
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regulations establishing that activities that "might cause disturbance of
surface resources" require an NOI, and activities "likely [to] cause
significant disturbance of surface resources" require a plan of operation,
which cannot be conducted until the United States Forest Service District
Ranger's approves the Plan.
In the present case, the Tribe argues that the Forest Service
incorrectly accepted the miners' four NOI's without consulting other
federal agencies. The ESA states that consultation is designed to
"determine whether [a] federal action is likely to jeopardize the survival of
a protected species and if so, to identify reasonable alternatives that will
avoid the action's unfavorable impacts." To require consultation, there
must be a "qualifying federal agency action." However, qualifying federal
agency action does not encompass all action related to planned private
activity; here it is the miners as private parties rather than the Forest
Service that are conducting the activity. Therefore, the Tribe had to
establish that the Forest Service authorized the miner's activities. The
court determined the NOI's were meant to be a notification procedure, not
an authorization of the proposed activities as the Tribe argues. The court
notes that requiring consultation for an NOI "would undermine the goals
of the entire scheme, the procedural device designed to avoid burdensome
compliance obligations."
In conclusion, the court determined that it is specifically the
federal mining laws that authorize federal mining activities. The Forest
Service's NOI does not authorize activities, especially those of the private
parties. Rather the NOI is a simple precautionary notification procedure;





Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Grantham, No. 10-17347, 2011
WL 1097749 (9th Cir. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011)
Plaintiffs Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center, Environmental
Protection Information Center, the Klamath Forest Alliance and the Center
for Biological Diversity (collectively "plaintiffs") bring suit against
defendants Patricia A. Grantham, the United States Forest Service, Rough
and Ready Lumber, LLC and South Bay Timber, LLC (collectively
"defendants") for a preliminary injunction to halt the post-fire salvage
logging in the Klamath National Forest. The district court denied the
motion for preliminary injunction, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirms.
The United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") determined
that emergency measures were necessary to regrow the Klamath National
Forest after fire swept through the area. The Forest Supervisor concluded
there was a high likelihood a tree could fall onto a car or person, causing
injury or damage. Therefore, in accordance with 36 C.F.R. § 215.2 and §
215.10(a), the Forest Service Chief determined that the Forest Plan, which
included the logging and replanting of the forest, should be immediately
implemented for "relief from hazards threatening human health and
safety" as well as to avoid the loss of the forest's economic value. The
plaintiffs challenge this decision, arguing that natural regeneration of the
forest was preferable under the circumstances and that the Forest Service
Chief abused his discretion by implementing the Forest Plan.
The district court held that the plaintiffs did not raise serious
questions on the merits of the National Forest Management Act. The
Forest Service had previously determined that logging and replanting trees
would be beneficial for several Aquatic Conservation Strategy ("ACS")
objectives. Further, the forest would recover faster than natural
regeneration would allow. The Forest Service had also submitted reports
concluding that natural regeneration would delay the restoration of
conifers in the area and would allow predators to take over instead. Active
replanting would allow the forest to recover decades faster. Further,
replanting could not occur without first removing the dead logs, and so
logging was essential to the recovery plan. Therefore, the Forest Service's
decision to allow logging and replanting of the forest was not an abuse of
discretion.
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The plaintiffs also argued that the purpose of the Forest Plan is to
allow only activities required to prevent the failure of ACS objectives.
The court held that so long as the Forest Service does not interpret the
Forest Plan arbitrarily, capriciously, or plainly inconsistent with the
regulations, the Forest Plan may be read broadly. Further, the plaintiffs
argued that the Forest Service should examine the Forest Plan under the
Elk Creek Watershed Analysis. The court held, however, that the Forest
Service may use a variety of reports to evaluate its decisions. In this
instance, the Forest Service supported its evaluations with scientific
research, and so it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
Further, the court found that the plaintiffs did not raise serious
questions as to whether an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") was
warranted under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). The
plaintiffs argued that an EIS was necessary because the forest is near the
Riparian Reserves, which are an ecologically critical area, and the Forest
Plan may have a significant effect on them. However, an EIS is not per se
warranted under NEPA just because a project is in close proximity to a





Sierra Club v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., No. 07-01860, 2011 WL 1466930
(D.D.C. Cir. 2011)
The Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service ("RUS")
must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") under the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") due to its involvement with
the expansion of a coal-fired plant in Holcomb, Kansas. The power plant
is owned by Sunflower Electric Power Corporation ("Sunflower"), which
is a co-defendant in the suit.
The Rural Electrification Act of 1936 provides that the Department
of Agriculture may issue loans with the purpose of providing electric
service in rural areas. The authority was delegated to RUS, which granted
the Sunflower's predecessor a loan in 1980 for the construction of a coal-
fired plant. In 2002, Sunflower's predecessor was reorganized into the
current Sunflower and a separate company that held some land and
facilities. The new Sunflower inherited some of the debt of its
predecessor, including the loans from the RUS. Under the negotiated
restructuring agreement, RUS required Sunflower to seek approval before
entering into certain types of contracts and before proceeding with a
second coal-fired unit in Holcomb.
One of the negotiated terms at issue in the case is that the terms of
the promissory notes between Sunflower and RUS were altered in the
restructuring, giving Sunflower more favorable terms. The class B notes
converted to non-interest bearing notes, with a shrinking principal such
that if Sunflower makes all the payments on the $88.5 million in notes on
time, it will end up paying only half of the face value. Other classes of
notes only become due if and when a second or third coal-fired unit are
built and become commercially operational.
In 2005, RUS granted approval for Sunflower to build a second
unit at its Holcomb facility. In 2007, Sunflower issued more promissory
notes for the additional financing of the new plant. These new notes all
bore interest, but like the notes from the restructuring were only payable if
and when the plants became commercially operational.
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS upon the
proposal of major actions that could significantly affect the environment.
RUS did prepare an EIS before granting the original 1980 loan, but failed
to do so during the debt restructuring in 2002, the plant approval in 2005,
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or the financing in 2007. The court found specifically that the 2002 debt
restructuring and the 2007 financing both constitute proposed, major
actions, which were subjected to NEPA.
While RUS contended that the restructuring and the financing did
not constitute a proposal, the court disagreed. Even though the proposal
only was to keep indirect federal control over an "otherwise non-federal
project," it was enough to apply under NEPA. Furthermore, RUS
maintained that its 2002 and 2007 interactions with Sunflower did not
constitute major actions, to which the court again disagreed. The court
found that because RUS had provided assistance and exercised control
both during the restructuring and in the approval for the second plant, the





Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime (America), Inc., 406 Fed.App'x 883 (5th Cir.
2010)
This case arose from an oil spill that occurred in 2008. Several
parties alleged injury by the spill, which occurred after a tanker collided
with a barge carrying fuel oil being towed by a tugboat. The plaintiffs
filed a class action suit against the tanker owner, barge owner and limited
liability company contracted to supply a crew for the tug. The District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered summary judgment for
the tanker owner, holding that it could not be held liable under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"). The barge owner appealed the decision.
The OPA assigns strict liability to the owners and operators of
vessels that discharge oil into the navigable waters of the United States.
The statute assigns liability to each party that is responsible for a vessel or
facility from which oil is discharged. The OPA defines a responsible
party as any person owning, operating, or chartering the vessel. However,
a complete defense is available to any party who can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the oil spill and subsequent damages
were caused solely by a third party. This does not include third parties
whose act or omission may have caused the spill in connection with their
contractual ties to the responsible party. Therefore, to relieve itself of
liability, a responsible party must establish that it had no fault in the spill
and that it was not in a contractual relationship with any party that had any
fault in the spill. In this case, the liability is shifted to the third party,
which is itself then liable to any claimant under the OPA.
American Commercial Lines, LLC ("ACL") owned the tugboat
that towed the barge that discharged the oil. ACL attempted to shift its
liability to the owner of the tanker, Tintomara Interests. Tintomara
Interests failed to argue that ACL had any fault in the spill. Therefore, the
only way Tintomara Interests could shift its liability under the OPA was
by showing that ACL had some contractual relationship with another party
with fault in the spill.
When Tintomara Interests filed a petition seeking to limit its
liability for claims arising out of the spill, ACL filed a claim alleging that
Tintomara Interests was liable to ACL for losses incurred as a responsible
party under the OPA. Because the OPA assigns strict liability to the
owner of the discharging vessel, Tintomara Interests moved for summary
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judgment regarding ACL's claim. Tintomara Interests' summary
judgment motion was based on the theory that ACL had admitted it was in
a contractual relationship with D.R.D. Towing, LLC ("DRD"), which
supplied personnel for the ACL's tug. Tintomara Interests alleged that
this admission made ACL a responsible party under the OPA. The district
court granted summary judgment to Tintomara Interests. Although
discovery had not yet taken place, the lower court reasoned that some of
the culpability for the oil spill was apportionable to ACL or its business
partner, and ACL could not shift OPA liability to Tintomara Interests.
The Fifth Circuit found that summary judgment was premature
given that discovery had not yet taken place. While DRD had some fault
in causing the collision and the subsequent oil spill, and while ACL was in
a contractual relationship with DRD, ACL is permitted to assert separate
claims and defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(3), even if
those claims or defenses are inconsistent. ACL's admission to being in a
contract with DRD was present on the face of its pleadings. However,
ACL had also filed a declaratory action to have its contracts with DRD
declared void. The Fifth Circuit did not address this question on its
merits, but the court found that summary judgment had been, at the very





Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 776 F.Supp.2d 1178 (D. Mont. 2011)
On August 5, 2010, the United States District Court for the District
of Montana ruled in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, that the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service's ("Service") 2009 Final Rule removing protection
for northern Rocky Mountain gray wolves in Idaho, Wyoming and
Montana violated the express terms of the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"). While appeal of the case was pending, the defendants and ten of
the fourteen plaintiffs reached a proposed settlement agreement. The
agreement, however, depended upon the court partially staying its
invalidation of the 2009 Final Rule, which effectively allows removal of
the gray wolf from the Endangered Species List ("ESL") in Idaho and
Montana only. In this order, Judge Molloy addressed whether the District
Court could grant such a stay, and discussed how a partial stay would
affect settlement negotiations and further litigation.
Plaintiffs claimed that allowing the partial stay would promote
recovery of the gray wolf in states other than Idaho and Montana, while
resolving the pending appeal and other related wolf litigation. The State
of Montana also argued its wolf population will continue to meet or
exceed federal recovery criteria under the management practices utilized,
and therefore the rule does not need to be upheld in Montana. Originally,
the environmental impact statement set forth by the Service set a goal of
10 breeding pairs and 100 wolves in three separate recovery areas for three
consecutive years. The Wyoming plan did not meet ESA standards, so
protection of wolves in that state would not be lifted in order to allow the
wolf population to recover in that state. The court found, however, that a
stay for Idaho and Montana would fail to promote "the interests of finality
or judicial economy" because the four remaining non-settling plaintiffs'
interest would not be served, and therefore the settlement agreement could
not be approved.
After Judge Molloy's settlement denial in Defenders of Wildlife,
Congress intervened with the ESL for the first time in history by removing
the Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf from the list in a policy rider attached to
the 2011 budget bill. The rider dictated that wolves' federal protection in
Montana and Idaho be lifted and managed instead by state wildlife
agencies. Originally, only the Service had the power to list or delist
animals from the ESL.
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The rider removes the wolves from the ESL because Congress
believed Idaho and Montana's state management plans were acceptable.
Public wolf hunting in Montana and Idaho has now begun in order to deal
with the "over-population" of gray wolves. The purpose of the hunting is
to hinder the threat the wolves pose to livestock and other wildlife,




Gardner v. United States Bureau of Land Management, 638 F.3d 1217
(9th Cir. 2011)
Little Canyon Mountain is located in Grant County, Oregon. It is
comprised of approximately 2,500 acres of land and is managed by the
United States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). Since 1985, Little
Canyon Mountain has been designated as "open use" land, meaning that
off-road vehicles are permitted to use the area year round. Located within
Little Canyon Mountain is a two-acre parcel of land known as "the pit."
The pit was once used for mining, but is now popular with off-road
vehicle users.
In 2003, the BLM conducted an environmental assessment to
determine the effects a proposed project would have on Little Canyon
Mountain. The project, designed to decrease fire risk and improve forest
health by reducing fuels, was predicted to increase off-road vehicle use in
the area around the pit. This increase was projected to lead within ten
years to noticeable impacts in erosion patterns and trail routes and to
disturbances in wildlife. To mitigate the potential impact, the proposal
suggested limiting access to the pit by vehicles more than fifty inches
wide. The proposal also created a buffer around the pit to provide a sight
and sound barrier between the area and surrounding land.
Local land owners, miners and grazers ("Plaintiffs") who claimed
to have been adversely affected by the increase in off-road vehicle use in
Little Canyon Mountain, filed a petition with the BLM in June 2006
asking that the area be immediately closed to all recreational off-road
vehicle use. The BLM's field manager in charge of Little Canyon
Mountain responded by letter to Plaintiffs' petition. The letter stated that
Little Canyon Mountain could be closed pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2(a)
only if off-road vehicle use was causing "considerable adverse effects"
upon the area. The letter also stated that the BLM was not aware of any
significant increased resource damage, but that they would welcome any
specific, quantifiable information that Plaintiffs could provide. The letter
further requested that Plaintiffs "show [the BLM] specific instances and
locations of significant problems."
Little Canyon Mountain remained open to off-road vehicle use and
plaintiffs continued to complain about what they perceived to be a
"dramatic increase in year-round off-road vehicle use." The BLM
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initiated an alternative dispute resolution process between the complaining
parties and off-road vehicle users, but it proved to be unsuccessful in
resolving the dispute. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in 2007. The
district court granted summary judgment to BLM, and Plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2(a) compelled
the BLM to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use. That
statute requires the immediate closure of areas used by off-road vehicles
when an "authorized officer determines that off-road vehicles are causing
or will cause considerable adverse effects upon soil, vegetation, wildlife,
wildlife habitat . . . or other resources." The court found, however, that
the BLM had not made a finding of "considerable adverse effects" that
would trigger the mandatory closure requirements of that statute. In fact,
BLM's field manager specifically told Plaintiff that she was not aware of
any significant adverse effects to Little Canyon Mountain, even when she
solicited more evidence about such concerns from Plaintiffs.
Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), an agency's decision must be upheld
unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." The court found that the BLM did not act in an
arbitrary or capricious fashion, as "the soil, vegetation, wildlife, wildlife
habitat. . . [and] other resources" located within the BLM were not
affected to the level required by 43 C.F.R. § 8341.2(a) for closure. The
court therefore held that the BLM did not unreasonably deny Plaintiffs'
petition to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use and




Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. EPA, 638 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir.
2011)
Per the requirements of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), the EPA is in
charge of reviewing various state implementation plans for air regulation
and determining whether they are adequate methods to reduce air
pollution. The California Air Resources Board submitted its state
implementation plan for the South Coast Air Basin (comprised of Orange
County and parts of Los Angeles, Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties); the plan included two "budgets" for motor vehicle emissions.
The EPA only approved part of this budget, rejecting the second section.
Various environmental groups ("Petitioners") challenged this ruling
arguing that the EPA could not have approved any portion of the budget.
This challenge was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
which confers jurisdiction to the appellate court for review of an
"adequacy" determination of an agency action. Thus, the standard of
review applied by the Ninth Circuit allowed the court to set aside the
challenged agency action only if it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
The goal of a state implementation plan is to provide for
enforcement of the national ambient air quality standards on a region-by-
region basis. Because different regions have varying levels of pollution
concerns, attainment of these standards has to be specifically tailored to
address these issues. Each state must show how they plan on attaining the
air quality set in the national ambient air quality standards. One way for a
state to show this is to set a "budget" for emissions from motor vehicles
for a given year. For the state implementation plan at issue here, there
were two different budgets to be satisfied. One budget, known as the SIP-
based budget, required that "reasonable further progress ... be achieved
for the 2009 and 2012 years, known as milestone years." The other
budget, known as the "baseline" budget, only required each applicable
milestone year to demonstrate "generally linear progress in reducing
emissions between the base year and the attainment year." For the South
Coast Air Basin, the base year was 2004, milestone years were 2009 and
2012 and the attainment year is 2015. The "baseline" budget only
contained emissions budgets for the milestone years. However, the SIP-
based budget contained more stringent emissions budgets for the
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milestone and attainment years based on anticipation of future legislative
action regarding emissions. During the public comment period,
Petitioners contested both plans' budgets arguing that the emissions
particles were much more numerous than the budgets assumed and thus
the proposed attainment could not occur without additional measures.
The EPA found that the Air Resources Board's SIP-based budget
was not adequate for motor emissions because it was based on and
assumed that various emission-control measures not yet in effect were in
fact going to be promulgated. However, the EPA did find that the baseline
budgets were adequate and could be implemented to act as a guide for
further transportation projects because they were "consistent with the
requirement to demonstrate reasonable further progress."
Petitioners brought this challenge arguing that the EPA failed to
consider the "attainment" year when it determined that the baseline budget
was adequate; the baseline budget only gave levels for the "milestone"
years. EPA admits that it did not consider the "attainment" date, but
argues that nothing in any statute or regulation requires it to do so.
Therefore, the issue in this case is whether or not the EPA must consider
attainment data when conducting an adequacy review of an emission
budget for a milestone year.
Although Petitioners put forth very logical and rational arguments,
the Ninth Circuit was bound by its standard of review. Looking to the text
of the federal regulations at issue, the court found that the plain-text
meaning of each rule supported the EPA's propositions. Nothing in any of
the regulations mandates that EPA consider attainment data when
determining adequacy of a milestone year emissions budget. Petitioners
made some plausible arguments showing how the language could
potentially be interpreted to support their own position, however, the
EPA's reading of its own regulations was very reasonable. Therefore, "an
alternative reading to the agency's interpretation is not compelled by the
regulation's plain language." Thus the Ninth Circuit denied the petition to
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STEPHEN JEFFREYROBERT BRUNDAGE STEPHEN KRCHMA
EDITOR'S PROSPECTIVE
We begin this edition with our lead article written by Ariele
Lessing, A Supplemental Labeling Regime for Organic Products: How the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Hampers a Market Solution to an Organic
Transparency Problem. In this article, Lessing brings to light the current
problems with the labeling standards of organic food. She explores how
the lack of a clear labeling system is misleading consumers who wish to
purchase organic food based on a variety of characteristics, including
sustainable farming and ethical labor practices, lack of chemical
contamination, and support for community farming. Ms. Lessing delves
into the National Organic Program and how its foundation did not
properly account for consumer expectations. The solution to this labeling
issue, according to Ms. Lessing, is through a supplemental system of
organic labels each addressing a variety of consumer concerns. This
system's implementation is currently hindered by the Food and Drug
Administration's regulation of "misleading" food labels, so Ms. Lessing
offers a solution by creating an exception specifically for organic labels.
Ms. Lessing concludes that market forces, which have been hindered by
the FDA's regulations, are better equipped to address the need for
transparency with organic labels and ultimately provide consumers with
the proper information needed to make informed decisions regarding their
food.
Turning to our student notes, Mark Abbott authors our first note,
Waste Not, Want Not: Low-Level Radioactive Waste and the United
States' Need for a Revised System of Disposal. In this note, Mr. Abbott
reviews the continuing problem with low-level radioactive waste disposal
in light of the recent case EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah. He utilizes the
EnergySolutions case to illustrate a widespread inability for America to
safely and efficiently manage its system of radioactive waste disposal.
Through his analysis of Congress's legislative history on the issue,
coupled with an examination of how foreign counterparts have dealt with
the same problem, Mr. Abbott proposes a solution that balances the need
for Congressional regulation with the ability of private companies to
effectively dispose of low-level radioactive waste. Mr. Abbott also
scrutinizes EnergySolutions in light of the recent 2011 Japanese
earthquake and tsunami which lead to a nuclear crisis in Japan. He
ultimately urges Congress to take a hard look at other countries'
management of radioactive waste and strive to create a safer, more secure,
and predictable system of low-level radioactive waste disposal.
Joshua Friel authors our second student note, Secular vs. Sacred:
NEPA Again Proves to be an Ineffective Tool to Protect Sacred Land,
which discusses Pit River Tribe v. United States Forest Service. In this
case, a Native American tribe sued the United States Forest Service to
prevent the development of a geothermal hotspot as encouraged by the
Geothermal Steam Act of 1970. The land at issue, while not owned by the
tribe, was considered sacred and culturally important yet the tribe was
unable to prevent development under the current system of preservation
laws. Mr. Friel delves into the policies behind both the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the National Historic Preservation
Act and discovers that neither act adequately serve to prevent sacred land.
While the two acts normally work to require courts and agencies to take a
"hard look" at proposed development and ensure that the greater good is
benefited, Mr. Friel deftly illustrates how both acts stop short of their true
goals. The tribe utilized every procedural tool available to it and was still
unable to protect its sacred land. Therefore, Mr. Friel proposes a new set
of regulations, either standing alone or as an amendment to the
Preservation Act, in order to provide substantial protection to sacred sites
such as those presented in this case.
Our third student note comes from David Martin, Crying Over
Spilt Milk: A Closer Look at Required Disclosures and the Organic Milk
Industry. This note examines the case of International Dairy Foods
Association v. Boggs, and focuses on a perceived bias against the organic
food industry's ability to label and advertise their products. The product
in question was organic milk, and the issue revolved around whether a
statute preventing organic suppliers from labeling their milk as hormone-
free violated the First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause. Mr.
Martin approached this issue through First Amendment grounds as well as
explaining the evolution of the FDA's regulations concerning organic food
labeling. Mr. Martin argues that the organic food industry is at a
disadvantage to conventional food producers who have greater power with
the regulatory bodies and are using the First Amendment as a shield
against further competition. With an uplifting conclusion, Mr. Martin
offers hope that despite setbacks, the organic food industry will continue
to grow and the legal system will eventually accommodate this change.
Kristin Michael authors our fourth student note, Mercury Rising?
Fifth Circuit Applies Administrative Laws Retroactively Deep in the Heart
of Texas. This note discusses Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy
Association, L.P., a case involving a legal fight over the applicability of
retroactive agency decisions. The construction of a coal-fired power plant
had been authorized during the Bush Administration's temporary
suspension of certain requirements of the Clean Air Act regarding all
major sources of air pollutants to follow a strict procedure to ensure that
each plant used the most efficient and modem pollution control
technology. However, by the time construction had actually begun, this
suspension had been overruled and the law required all major sources of
pollutants to go through this rigorous determination process. The main
question revolved around the retroactive applicability of these types of
decisions. Ms. Michael makes clean work of the confusing MACT
requirement standard by skillfully exploring its history and requirements,
and gives a thorough explanation of the issues and cases involving
retroactive administrative decisions. She comments extensively on the
tension between elimination pollution and encouraging construction
projects without skyrocketing costs. Ms. Michael presents both criticisms
and opinions favoring the Sandy Creek decision and warns that this issue
could quickly become a hodgepodge of split circuit decisions. She urges
for uniformity and clearer precedent on the matter.
Our final case note is authored by Katherine Vogt, Do Polluters
Truly Pay? A Chip in the "Potentially Responsible Parties" Analysis for
Hazardous Waste Cleanup. Exploring the repercussion of Celanese
Corporation v. Martin K Eby Construction Company, Inc., Ms. Vogt
determines that although CERCLA is typically thought to apportion
cleanup costs for spills among the parties responsible for creating the spill,
due to recent controlling precedent, this may not always be the case. She
finds a small "chip" in the typical analysis regarding a very specific fact
pattern, a party may not be liable as an arranger under CERCLA if it did
not take any intentional steps leading to the spill. While this normally
does not produce errant results, the Celanese case resulted in a party who
was found to be the direct cause of a multi-million dollar spill not on the
hook for a single dollar. Ms. Vogt uses the history and purpose of the
CERCLA statute to argue that this result is not fulfilling the policy
inherent in CERCLA. She proposes a number of solutions, including
broadening state negligence law to help cover any slack during the few
times this specific issue arises. Ultimately, Ms. Vogt places faith in the
court system to determine a scheme that ensures the polluter truly pays.
As always, this volume ends with updates discussing recent court
holdings throughout the country that impact environmental law.
It is with great excitement that we take this time to announce that
starting with our next issue, Vol. 19 No. 1, the MIssouRI ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY REVIEW is changing its name to the JOURNAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SUSTAINABILITY LAW. Environmental law is an
ever-evolving field and the emergence of legal and policy issues
pertaining to sustainability has created an onslaught of new scholarship.
Through this change in our name, we hope to demonstrate a commitment
to the global nature of environmental law and the next phase of sustainable
law development. We are commemorating this name change with a
symposium to be held on March 9, 2012 entitled "Environmental Justice
Issues in Sustainable Development." This symposium will feature
Professors Michael Gerrard, Eileen Gauna, Uma Outka, John Dernbach,
and Patrick McGinley.
We offer special thanks and recognition to the 2011-2012 Editorial
Board for its hard work on Volume 18 of the Journal. Each edition
requires diligence, dedication, and passion to be successful, and we have
had an abundance of these qualities throughout the year.
Finally, a huge thank you goes to our advisor, Professor Troy Rule,
for his inestimable help and limitless enthusiasm for the subject and our
new direction.
KATHERINE E. VOGT
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, 2011-2012
